

Explaining Muslims' Aggressive Tendencies Towards the West: The Role of Negative Stereotypes, Anger, Perceived Conflict and Islamic Fundamentalism

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Abstract

The current research was to investigate what psychological factors predict Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West, and the underlying mechanism by which the negative stereotypes can translate into Muslims' aggressive tendencies towards the West. A correlational survey among a sample of Indonesian Muslims ($N = 360$) demonstrated that the more participants negatively stereotyped the West, the more they thought that Muslims should aggress the latter group. We also found as expected that Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West were positively predicted by the perceived conflict between Islam and the West, and this perceived intergroup conflict in turn mediated the role of Islamic fundamentalism in predicting the negative stereotypes. These findings in sum highlight the role of contextual and individual

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factors in predicting Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West, as well as the impact of these stereotypes on Muslims' aggressive tendencies towards the West. Theoretical implications and research limitations of these empirical findings are discussed.

Keywords

Negative stereotypes, aggression, anger, intergroup conflict, Islamic fundamentalism

Introduction

September 11 attacks, Iran's nuclear programme, Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons in a Danish newspaper, Turkey's exclusion from European Union, the European refugee crisis due to the war between a US-led coalition and Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria—what these events have in common is their association with tensions and conflict that seemingly collide Muslims with Westerners, which are covered in news headlines that bombard us almost every day. In the current research, we argue that the tensions and conflict make Muslims prone to claim their group as the victim of harmful actions inflicted by the West. This sense of collective victimhood (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009) spurs Muslims' negative attitudes towards and, ultimately, their tendencies to act hostilely against the West. To test these ideas, we integrate some social psychological theories and demonstrate that the negative stereotypes catalyse Muslims' aggressive behaviours towards the West. However, this relationship between negative stereotypes and aggressive tendencies is mediated by the extent to which Muslims feel anger against the West. We also show that the perception of conflict between Islam and the West not only directly predicts Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West, but also mediates the positive relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and the negative stereotypes.

Negative Stereotypes and Aggressive Tendencies: The Mediating Role of Anger

Previous worldwide surveys have demonstrated that some Muslims adopt negative views of the West. The 2002 Gallup's Poll of the Islamic World of 10,000 people in the mainly Islamic countries (i.e., Indonesia,

Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), for example, reported that Muslim respondents associated a number of traits with Westerners such as arrogant, non-religious, selfish, immoral and fond of interfering with the domestic affairs of other countries (Newport, 2002). Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2006 (Pew Research Center, 2006) and 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2011) revealed that Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan and Indonesia characterised Westerners as selfish, immoral, greedy, violent and fanatical. This phenomenon within social psychology literature is captured in the term negative stereotypes, defined as fixed, overgeneralised beliefs or expectations about unfavourable and pejorative characters or traits that people attribute to the outgroup and its individual members (Czopp, 2008).

Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that when people consider themselves as members of a social group, they are motivated to protect and enhance their positive collective identities (i.e., ideologies, norms, values and culture), which make them vulnerable to negative stereotypes. This motivation can be done, typically by asserting that the collective identities of the outgroup are inferior to those of people's own group, and this derogatory social comparison in turn evokes negative stereotypes (Voci, 2014). When people firmly believe in the negative stereotypes of the outgroup, their attitudes and behaviours are strongly oriented towards conflictive relations with members of the latter group (Schwartz & Struch, 1989). Characterised as such, negative stereotypes have been found to provoke derogatory attitudes in terms of, for example, dehumanisation (Fiske, 2009), as well as unfair intergroup behaviours in terms of, for example, discrimination towards the outgroup (Fiske, 1998). Even more detrimentally, social-psychological review by Burgess (2017) found that people's mere knowledge and endorsement of negative stereotypes gave rise to both physical aggression (e.g., increased shooting) and social aggression (e.g., increased tolerance of racist statements, sexual harassment and even assault) against members of the stereotyped outgroups. There are therefore the multifarious ways negative stereotypes impact people's reactions and behaviours that are harmful to members of the stereotyped groups.

Despite that negative stereotypes are assumed to directly impact on aggressive tendencies as put forward earlier in this article, yet this effect, according to some social psychological theories, may be mediated by negative emotions. Emotion theorists, for example, have long advocated that affect arguably precedes and motivates either cognition or behaviour (refer to Zajonc, 1998, for a review). This argument implies the primacy of

affect as opposed to cognition in influencing behaviour. Corroborating this notion, a meta-analysis by Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, and Gaertner (1996) showed that prejudice, which refers to unfavourable feelings towards other people solely on basis of these people's group membership, performed a better job than negative stereotypes in predicting discrimination against the stereotyped outgroups. Moreover, the framework of behaviours from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS map; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) asserts that the impact of negative stereotypes on aggressive tendencies is mediated by, or passes via negative emotions. This proposition is aligned with appraisal theories of emotion (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), which include intergroup emotion theory (IET; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), postulating that affects mediate the role of cognitions in predicting behaviours.

More specifically, the BIAS map posits that warmth is one of the two central dimensions of stereotype content, along with competence, that shapes the divergent emotions and actions tendencies people chronically attribute with specific outgroups (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Warmth stereotypes denote the perceptions of friendliness, sincerity and sociability of another group, which provides information about the positivity or negativity of the intentions of the outgroup (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Outgroups that are stereotypically viewed as warm (e.g., fair/moral, sincere, sociable) are perceived as having good intentions, and those that are stereotypically seen as cold (e.g., unfair/immoral, aggressive, selfish) are perceived as having hostile intentions. Outgroups that are viewed as hostile elicit feelings of anger because they are seen as undermining people's aspirations to achieve the desired outcomes for their group (Cuddy et al., 2007; see also socio-functional threat-based approach to prejudice; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Within the context of Muslim–Western relations, Rabasa, Waxman, Larson, and Marcum (2004) argued that Muslims' anger and resentment towards the West are primarily rooted at the first group's perception that the USA and its allies have incessantly supported Israel, and that their military powers present in and intervene Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Perfectly in accordance with these arguments, previous research among Muslims in predominantly Islamic countries (e.g., Furia & Lucas, 2008) revealed that hostility, which is seen as emotionality that contains anger (Watson & Clark, 1992), towards the West was in part attributable to the first group's negative views of the latter group that are indicative of low warmth stereotypes (i.e., unfairness of the West in executing foreign policies towards Islamic worlds).

The BIAS map furthermore reckons anger as a negative emotion that increases behavioural tendencies aimed at aggressing the stereotyped outgroups. Some studies have empirically confirmed this contention. For example, Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, and Petrovi (2010) found that among Serbians, anger towards Albanians in Serbia (Study 1) or Bosniaks in Bosnia (Study 2) positively predicted participants' support for harmful actions to the latter groups. In a similar vein, Tausch et al. (2011) found that British Muslims' anger towards the disadvantaged status of Muslims in India was positively related to their support for ingroup violence. In brief, the BIAS map postulates the sequence of negative stereotypes, anger and active harming. In support of this premise, Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebels, and Dovidio (2012) observed that stereotyping an outgroup as less warm augmented feelings of anger, and this negative emotion ultimately mediated the effect of the negative stereotypes on behavioural intentions to aggress the stereotyped outgroup. We therefore predicted on the basis of BIAS map that the more Muslims negatively stereotyped the West, the more Muslims would support actions aimed at aggressing the West (Hypothesis 1a), but this positive relationship between the negative stereotypes and the aggressive tendencies would be mediated by Muslims' feelings of anger towards the West (Hypothesis 1b).

Perceived Intergroup Conflict and Negative Stereotypes

An international survey by Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2006 (Pew Research Center, 2006) among respondents in European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain) and in predominantly Islamic countries (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan and Nigeria) reported that Muslim public viewed their relations with the West as generally poor. When a similar survey was conducted in 2011 among respondents in Palestine, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia, Muslims continued to hold such pessimism (Pew Research Center, 2011). These results reflect on the tendency of Muslims to perceive that their group is in conflict with the West. Perceived intergroup conflict refers to ingroup members' subjective belief that their group is in competition with other groups for valued resources, be they tangible such as wealth, territory and group power or intangible such as social status and ideology (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998).

The crucial aspect of intergroup conflict, which makes it hard to reconcile, is not the existence of real competition, but the perception of competition over tangible or intangible resources, denoting a sense that what one group gains is considered to be the loss of other groups (Levine & Hogg, 2010). Perceived intergroup conflict therefore makes people's competitive mindset to accrue, such that they are prone to develop negative views of the outgroup (Gaunt, 2011). This is the case because, according to Bar-Tal et al. (2009), intergroup conflict is a common cause of collective victimhood, denoting people's tendency to perceive the adversary outgroup as inflicting intentional harm, which is viewed as undeserved, unjust and immoral, with severe consequences for their own group. From a cognitive perspective (Blanton, 2001), perceived intergroup conflict triggers negative stereotypes because it may make people to become more attentive to information that indicates dissimilarities than similarities between these people's own group and the relevant outgroup. In this case, bias occurs in the sense that people positively stereotype their group while simultaneously negatively stereotyping the outgroup (Riketta, 2005). From a motivational perspective, Esses et al. (1998) suggested that negative stereotypes mirror outgroup derogation, which serves as a medium through which people strategically attempt to remove the source of perceived competition. Struch and Schwartz (1989) argued that perceived intergroup conflict triggers negative stereotypes, because by adopting these derogatory cognitive beliefs, people want to justify the actions of their group towards the outgroup. Some empirical studies have provided empirical evidence for the perceived intergroup conflict and negative stereotypes prediction. Cross-national studies in Central or Eastern European countries (e.g., Poppe & Linssen, 1999), for example, found that the perceived inter-nation conflict negatively predicted participants' positive stereotypes of the outgroups (i.e., warmth and morality). Drawing on these empirically findings and theoretical rationales elaborated earlier in this article, we therefore predicted that the more Muslims perceived their group as being in conflict with the West the more they would negatively stereotype the West (Hypothesis 2a).

Some scholars (e.g., Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001) argued that the stronger people's perception of intergroup conflict is, the more they exhibit cognitive and behavioural components of prejudice. This argument implies that more perceived intergroup conflict is not only implicated in enhanced negative stereotypes (i.e., the cognitive component of prejudice) as predicted earlier in this article, but also in enhanced aggression (the behavioural component of prejudice). In elucidating the

interrelations between perceived intergroup conflict and the cognitive and behavioural components of prejudice, BIAS map (Fiske et al., 2002) proposes a mediational sequence of perceived intergroup conflict, negative stereotypes and active harming. In this regard, the BIAS map posits that perceived intergroup conflict, due to its close association with the perception of competition, enhances people's tendency to construe the outgroup as having hostile rather than good intentions. These perceived hostile intentions are thought to be accountable for motivating people to negatively stereotype the outgroup, from which the intentions of the first group to aggress or harm the latter group then arise. Substantiating this premise, research by Struch and Schwartz (1989) revealed that the more Jewish residents in Jerusalem perceived their group as being in conflict with ultraorthodox Jews in their neighbourhoods, the less they attributed humanity traits (e.g., social compassion, concern about social welfare) to the latter group. These negative stereotypes in turn positively predicted participants' aggressive tendencies (social distance, support for overt aggressive actions) against the ultraorthodox Jews. Gaunt (2011) observed that the more Israeli Jewish and Arab participants perceived a conflict between them, the less the both sides held warmth stereotypes of the other. These decreased warmth stereotypes in turn attenuated participants' intentions for intergroup contact. With reference to these empirical findings, we predicted that Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West would mediate the positive relationship between perceived intergroup conflict and Muslims' aggressive tendencies towards the West (Hypothesis 2b).

The Role of Islamic Fundamentalism

A 2006 survey report released by the Pew Global Attitudes Project concluded that general public in Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain were concerned about Islamic extremism in their country (Pew Research Center, 2006). Indeed, according to individualistic social-psychological perspectives (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), religious extremism is a particular type of personality considered to be closely linked to negative stereotypes. Among multifarious types of religious extremism, religious fundamentalism has received much attention from social psychologists who have tried to assess its explanatory role in predicting negative stereotypes. Religious fundamentalism refers to 'the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic intrinsic, essential,

innerrant truth about humanity and deity' (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118). However, the existing social–psychological research demonstrates mixed results regarding the relationship between religious fundamentalism and negative stereotypes. The two constructs have been found to be positively related (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), but they could be unrelated (e.g., Mashuri, Akhrani, & Zaduqisti, 2016) and even negatively related (e.g., Beller & Kröger, 2017).

Another line of research has verified that the relationship between religious fundamentalism and negative stereotypes is not direct, but indirect via the perception of conflict. Kunst, Thomsen, and Sam (2014), for example, found that religious fundamentalism among Muslims and Christians alike enhanced mutual negative stereotypes (e.g., ignorant, aggressive, dishonest) by a mediation of dual Abrahamic categorisation, a concept denoting common roots of Islam and Christianity regardless of their different teachings and practices. Religious fundamentalism in this research depressed dual Abrahamic categorisation given that fundamentalists may perceive it as being incompatible or in conflict with their religious identity. Resonating with this rationale, Mashuri, Akhrani et al. (2016) found among Indonesian Muslims that Islamic fundamentalism led to the perceived conflict between Islam and the West in their competition for material resources (e.g., economy, politics) or symbolic resources (e.g., value, culture). These conflict perceptions, in turn, positively predicted the degree to which Muslims negatively stereotyped Western powers as conspirators that have clandestinely engineered terrorism in Indonesia. Taking into account these empirical findings, we therefore predicted that the more Muslims exhibited Islamic fundamentalism, the more they would perceive Islam as being in conflict with the West (Hypothesis 3a). In turn, we predicted that this perceived intergroup conflict would mediate the positive relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West (Hypothesis 3b).

The Context and Overview of the Current Research

We conducted this research in Indonesia, a nation that is hailed as the world's largest Muslim population. The estimated Muslim population in Indonesia is 205 million, which makes up 13 per cent of the world's Muslims (Pew Research Center, 2010; Word Population Review, 2018). Indonesia was established in 1945 when it declared independence from the Dutch empire. This history of colonialism has fuelled unfavourable

views of the West, more prominently among Indonesian nationalists, as well as among some Indonesian Muslims are also hinge the anti-West sentiments upon their perception that Islamic values have been undermined by the West (Nertz, 2014).

The term 'the West' in the current research was operationalised, with reference to prior studies conducted in Indonesia (i.e., Mashuri, Akhrani et al., 2016; Mashuri, Zaduqisti, Sukmawati, Sakdiah, & Suharini, 2016), as the USA along with Israel and Western European countries supposed to be its allies. The USA and Israel were selected on the top of the list, due to some Indonesian Muslims' tendency to judge the two countries as international powers that continuously threaten the interests of Islamic worlds, more especially Palestine (Khisbiyah, 2009). We included the UK and the Netherlands as the priority list of Western European countries because of UK's dominant power in the history of colonialism in the world and the Dutch's particular history of colonialism in Indonesia.

Method

Participants

Participants were 360 undergraduate students from State Islamic Institute of Pekalongan (IAIN Pekalongan), Central Java, Indonesia (246 females, 110 males; 4 participants did not indicate their gender; $M_{\text{age}} = 20.46$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 2.01$). All participants self-identified as Muslim, and they took part in the current research voluntarily, in return of no reward. This research was designed as a correlational survey.

Procedure and Measures

We administered the current research in classrooms where research assistants distributed the questionnaire to participants. This questionnaire and all related materials have been approved by Research Ethics Board of IAIN Pekalongan (reference number: 596/In.30/H/PP.00.6/11/2018). The questionnaire commenced with informed consent. Upon reading and signing the informed consent, participants were presented with a series of questions to assess variables in the current research. These variables included Islamic fundamentalism, perceived intergroup conflict, negative stereotypes, anger and aggressive tendencies. All measures were created by averaging the items on which participants

were asked to indicate their agreement with the 7-point-answering scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

We assessed *Islamic fundamentalism* with 20 items (e.g., ‘Allah has given mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed’; ‘Islam has different versions of the truth, and may be equally right in their own way [R]’; $\alpha = 0.64$), which were adopted from Mashuri, Akhrani et al. (2016). This scale was originally adapted from Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). Following a procedure by Kunst et al. (2014), the adaption was done by alternating general religious terminologies such as God and religion, as well as Christian terminologies such as Bible with Islamic terminologies. Accordingly, we changed ‘God’ with ‘Allah’, ‘religion’ with ‘Islam’ and ‘Bible’ with ‘Quran’. *Perceived intergroup conflict* was assessed with six items (e.g., ‘I think there is a conflict between Islamic worlds and the West in the current era’; ‘Muslims and Westerners compete with each other’; $\alpha = 0.88$), which were adapted from prior research (i.e., Gaunt, 2011; Riketta, 2005; Struch & Schwartz, 1989).

Negative stereotypes were adapted from Fiske et al. (2002) in which participants were asked to what extent they viewed the West as having five low warmth traits (i.e., ‘unfriendly’; ‘ill-intentioned’; ‘untrustworthy/insincere’; ‘cold’; ‘ill-natured’; $\alpha = 0.93$).¹ To assess *anger*, participants were asked to indicate how much they felt four negative emotions to the West as their response to what the West has done or currently does towards Muslims (i.e., ‘hatred’, ‘angry’, ‘furious’, ‘irritated’; $\alpha = 0.88$). We adapted this scale from the previous research (i.e., Mackie et al., 2000; Tam et al., 2007). Finally, *aggressive tendencies* were assessed with four items in which participants were asked to rate how much Muslims should demonstrate some aggressive behavioural tendencies in responding to their current relations with the West (e.g., ‘Muslims should argue with the West’; ‘Muslims should find out more about the West [R]’; $\alpha = 0.71$), adapted from Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, and Cairns (2009). Upon indicating their age and gender, participants were thanked and debriefed.²

Results

Analytic Strategies

Unless otherwise indicated, the data were analysed in terms of path model using Mplus version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015). We used robust maximum likelihood (MLR) estimation, which is desirable for data

that violate the assumption of multivariate normality because under such a condition, it can correct the standard errors (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). The MLR has also been found to be more superior in handling missing data to other techniques such as listwise deletion (Schafer & Graham, 2002).³ To assess the goodness of fit of the path model, we used chi-square (χ^2), root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), and Tucker–Lewis index (TLI). According to Hu and Bentler (1999), the path model fits the data very well when its χ^2 is not significant, whereas its RMSEA is less than 0.05, with CFI and TLI greater than 0.95.

Hypotheses Testing

The path analysis showed that the hypothesised model fitted the data very well, $\chi^2(5) = 7.19, p = 0.207$, RMSEA = 0.04, 90 per cent CI [0.000, 0.087], CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.97 (Figure 1). This path model accounted for 11 per cent variance of aggressive tendencies, $SE = 0.04, p = 0.002$, 19 per cent variance of anger ($SE = 0.05, p < 0.001$), 4 per cent variance of negative stereotypes ($SE = 0.02, p = 0.046$) and 14 per cent variance of perceived intergroup conflict ($SE = 0.04, p < 0.001$). As shown in Figure 1, negative stereotypes positively predicted aggressive tendencies, $\beta = 0.19, SE = 0.06, p = 0.001$, 95 per cent confidence interval (CI) = [0.076, 0.304], power = 0.93, in line with Hypothesis 1a.⁴ Negative stereotypes also positively predicted anger, $\beta = 0.43, SE = 0.06, p < 0.001$, 95 per cent CI = [0.320, 0.542], power = 1.00, and this negative emotion in turn positively predicted aggressive tendencies, $\beta = 0.21, SE = 0.06, p < 0.001$, 95 per cent CI = [0.090, 0.320], power = 0.96. Within these relationships, confirming Hypothesis 1b, anger significantly mediated the role of negative stereotypes in enhancing aggressive tendencies, $\beta = 0.09, SE = 0.03, p = 0.001$, 95 per cent CI = [0.034, 0.142], power = 0.95.

Perceived intergroup conflict fostered negative stereotypes, $\beta = 0.21, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001$, 95 per cent CI = [0.104, 0.305], power = 0.98, corroborating Hypothesis 2a. In turn, supporting Hypothesis 2b, negative stereotypes mediated the positive relationship between perceived intergroup conflict and aggressive tendencies, $\beta = 0.04, SE = 0.02, p = 0.014$, 95 per cent CI = [0.008, 0.070], power = 0.82. Islamic fundamentalism positively predicted perceived intergroup conflict, $\beta = 0.37, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001$, 95 per cent CI = [0.266, 0.469], power = 1.00, in line with Hypothesis 3a. Perceived intergroup conflict, in turn,




Figure 1. The Results of the Hypothesised Model in the Current Research

Source: The author.

Note: ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

mediated the role of Islamic fundamentalism in enhancing negative stereotypes, $\beta = 0.08$, $SE = 0.02$, $p = 0.001$, 95 per cent CI = [0.032, 0.119], power = 0.97, confirming Hypothesis 3b.

Competing Models

The hypothesised model in the current research was compared to other theory-driven competing models, to prevent confirmation bias by researcher (Kline, 2011). Following Hyland et al. (2018), the hypothesised model is said to be more superior to a competing model when its chi-square, RMSEA, CFI and TLI are better than those of the rival model. However, when the two models similarly fit well to the data, another criterion that should be taken into account is parsimony, denoting the extent to which the hypothesised model efficiently represents the data relative to its competing model. To address this issue, comparison of two nested models was based on chi-square difference test, whereas that of two non-nested models was based on Akaike information criterion (AIC). The hypothesised model is said to be more efficiently representing the data than its nested competing model when the chi-square and AIC of the predicted model are less than those of the competing model. To be meaningful, the AIC difference should be 4 or greater (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). However, it is important to note that to ensure their comparability, two non-nested models should have the same level of complexity (i.e., the same degree of freedom; MacCallum & Austin, 2000). Table 1 summarises the results of the model comparisons.

Competing model 1. The first competing model was a saturated model (Figure B1) to assess the parsimony of the hypothesised model (Kline, 2011). Given that the hypothesised model and the saturated model similarly fitted well to the data (i.e., chi-square is not significant, RMSEA below 0.05, CFI and TLI above 0.95) and that the first model was nested within the second model, we compared the relative parsimony of both models using chi-square difference test. The results showed that the chi-square of the saturated model, $\chi^2(0) = 0.000$, was not significantly lower than that of the hypothesised model, $\chi^2(5) = 7.19$, $\Delta\chi^2(5) = -7.19$, $p > 0.05$. The additional paths within the saturated model were therefore empirically redundant. This verifies that the hypothesised model fits to the data well and more efficiently represents the data as opposed to the saturated model.

Table 1. Comparison of the Hypothesised Model and Competing Models

Path Models	χ^2 (df) p	(Δ df) $\Delta\chi^2$	RMSEA (95% CI)	CFI	TLI	AIC	Δ AIC
1. Hypothesised model IF → PIC → NS → AGR → AT and NS → AT	7.192(5) 0.207	-	0.035 (0.00, 0.087)	0.98	0.97	4875.138	-
2. Competing model 1 IF → PIC → NS → AGR → AT and NS → AT, PIC → AGR + AT, IF → NS + AGR + AT	0.00(0) 0.00	(5) 7.192	0.000	1.00	1.00	-	-
3. Competing model 2 IF → PIC → AGR → NS → AT and AGR → AT	13.379(5) 0.020	-	0.068 (0.025, 0.114)	0.94	0.88	4882.702	-7.564
4. Competing model 3 PIC → IF → NS → AGR → AT and NS → AT	15.254(5) 0.009	-	0.076 (0.034, 0.120)	0.93	0.86	4376.497	498.641
5. Competing model 4 IF → PIC → NS → AT and PIC → AGR, AGR → AT	53.573(5) <0.001	-	0.165 (0.127, 0.206)	0.66	0.31	4940.701	-65.563
6. Competing model 5 NS → PIC → IF → AT and AGR → AT	16.903(5) 0.005	-	0.081 (0.041, 0.126)	0.87	0.77	5584.346	-709.208

Source: The author.

Note: IF = Islamic fundamentalism; PIC = perceived intergroup conflict; NS = negative stereotypes; AGR = anger; AT = aggressive tendencies.

Competing model 2. The second competing model (Figure B2) was based on ‘affect as evaluative judgements’ hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 2007), which is not nested within the hypothesised model. This hypothesis suggests that negative affects make people to perceive the object of judgement as lacking value, which leads to a negative evaluation. The results showed that the fit indices of the second competing model (i.e., chi-square is significant, RMSEA greater than 0.05, CFI and TLI less than 0.95) were worse than the hypothesised model. The AIC of the hypothesised model (= 4875.138) was also significantly less than that of the competing model 2 (= 4882.702), $\Delta\text{AIC} = -7.564$. The hypothesised model hence fits to, and efficiently represents the data more than the second competing model.

Competing model 3. The third competing model (Figure B3) was also non-nested within the hypothesised model in which Islamic fundamentalism was preceded by perceived intergroup conflict (Mashuri, Zaduqisti, Sakdiah, & Sukmawati, 2015; Moghaddam, 2009). In turn, Islamic fundamentalism is a direct predictor of negative stereotypes (Hunsberger, 1995). As can be seen, the fit indices of the third competing model were not decent as its chi-square was significant, RMSEA greater than 0.05, with CFI and TLI less than 0.95. However, the AIC of the hypothesised model was significantly greater than that of the third competing model (4376.497), $\Delta\text{AIC} = 498.641$. These results imply that the hypothesised model fits to the data better than the third competing model, despite that it is considered less efficient than the latter model in representing the data.

Competing model 4. Again, the fourth competing model (Figure B4) was not nested within the hypothesised model in which negative stereotypes and anger were specified as simultaneously and uniquely predicting aggressive tendencies. This assumption was based on competitive collection action model (Wright, 2009) positing that negative stereotypes and anger similarly serve as the justification of intergroup conflict, which render people to support actions aimed at aggressing the outgroup. We found that the fit indices of the fourth competing model were not ideal, with the chi-square being significant, RMSEA exceeding the cut-off value of 0.05, CFI and TLI being less than 0.95. Moreover, the AIC of the hypothesised model was significantly less than that of the fourth competing model (4940.701), $\Delta\text{AIC} = -65.563$. The hypothesised model therefore better fits and more efficiently represents the given data than the fourth competing model.

Competing model 5. We specified the fifth competing model (Figure B5) in which negative stereotypes preceded perceived intergroup conflict, based on integrated threat theory of prejudice (ITT; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2016). This perceived intergroup conflict is ultimately thought to augment Islamic fundamentalism (Moghaddam, 2009), which itself may set into motion collective conflict (Rogers et al., 2007). The results revealed that the fit indices of the fifth competing model were inferior to the hypothesised model, given its significant chi-square, RMSEA that was above 0.05, with CFI and TLI being below 0.95. The hypothesised model also had the AIC value that was significantly less than the fifth competing model (AIC = 5584.346), Δ AIC = -709.208. As such, the hypothesised model provides better fit to the data, as well as more parsimoniously represents the data than the fifth competing model.

Discussion

With the aim of examining the antecedents and consequences of Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West, the current research revealed that the stronger Muslims harboured the negative stereotypes the more they demonstrated aggressive tendencies towards the West. This relationship as predicted was mediated by how much Muslims expressed feelings of anger against the West. We also found that Muslims' perception of conflict between Islam and the West positively predicted the negative stereotypes, and these stereotypes mediated the relationship between the perceived intergroup conflict and aggressive tendencies. The final findings demonstrated that Islamic fundamentalism was a positive predictor of perceived intergroup conflict, and this perception mediated the role of Islamic fundamentalism in boosting Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West. We systemised these predictions in a hypothesised model and found that its fit indices were better than the five theory-driven competing models, ruling out alternative explanations that can contradict the predictions.

Theoretical Implications

The current research revealed that when Muslims stereotyped the West as cold or less warm (e.g., unfriendly, ill-intentioned), the more they demonstrated aggressive tendencies towards the latter group. This finding

implies that the positive association between negative stereotypes and aggressive tendencies holds true not only among Westerners as extensively disseminated in prior research, but also among Muslims that are yet sorely understudied. However, we also assessed anger to elucidate the psychological process by which negative stereotypes cause aggressive tendencies. The inclusion of anger in the current research extends prior studies that have relatively escaped their attention to examine it within the context of Muslim–Western conflictive relations. We proposed how anger is a potent predictor of aggressive tendencies more so than negative stereotypes. In support of this prediction, the current research revealed that the impact of negative stereotypes on aggressive tendencies was mediated by anger. This observation therefore provides empirical evidence for the basic tenet of the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007) suggesting how the outgroup that is viewed as less warm elicits feelings of anger, and this negative emotion in turn increases people’s tendency to aggress the stereotyped outgroup.

Social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) posits that anger is the potent driving force behind people’s motivation to confront the outgroup. This relationship, however, according to SIMCA occurs more typically when anger is operationalised as hostile feelings towards the outgroup people perceive as having unjustly treated them. This proposition thus suggests that anger strongly incites aggressive tendencies more pronouncedly when we think of this emotion as a corollary of people’s negative perceptions of the outgroup actions. In relation to these arguments, the finding in the current research that anger was the strongest predictor of aggressive tendencies is noteworthy. This is because in the current research, anger was assessed by asking participants how much they felt the negative emotion in responding to Westerners’ past or current actions towards Muslims. In this regard, the information about the valence of the outgroup actions was absent, such that the actions by Westerners towards Muslims were not described as negative or positive. Anger in the present work hence denotes Muslims’ reactive emotion to the actions by Westerners, regardless of whether Muslims themselves negatively interpret the outgroup. This in brief gives insight into how mere feeling of anger, or anger that emerges independent of people’s own appraisals of the outgroup actions, is a sufficient condition to make such a hostile emotion to be a strong predictor of aggressive tendencies.

Perceived intergroup conflict in the current research stood out as a significant predictor of Muslims’ negative stereotypes of the West. This observation resonates with an instrumental model of group conflict

(Esses et al., 1998). This model suggests that the perceptions of intergroup conflict are rooted at the competition, whether actual or merely imagined, for tangible or intangible resources. Perceived intergroup conflict, as the model reckons, ignites negative stereotypes because it enhances intergroup competition, which propel people towards expressing unfavourable attitudes and attributions towards competitor groups. Moreover, the model describes that the more the outgroup is considered salient from people's own group, the more it is perceived as a potential competitor, thereby provoking greater negative stereotypes. Factors such as group size and distinct values, appearances and behaviours can enhance the salience of the outgroups (Esses et al., 1998). Within the context of Muslims–Westerners relations, there have been a series of events that may prompt Muslims to see Westerners as a salient outgroup. These events include, among other things, the Satanic Verses controversy in 1988–1989, the first Gulf war in 1991 and Danish caricature of Prophet Muhammad in 2005 (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015). The rise of anti-Muslim movements in Western countries can probably be regarded as the most up-to-date example of the events. Overall, these events seem to be not in favour of Muslims, which plausibly lead this group to deem Westerners as a salient outgroup. As a result, Muslims may view Westerners as their competitor. With this perception, it thus makes sense to find, as empirically shown in the current research, that perceived intergroup conflict fosters Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West.

The impact of Islamic fundamentalism on negative stereotypes in the current research was mediated by perceived intergroup conflict. This observation suggests that Islamic fundamentalism generates Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West because of its role in promoting Muslims' perception that their group and the West clash. This argument is aligned with prior research (e.g., Mashuri, Akhrani et al., 2016) demonstrating that Muslim fundamentalists are very concerned about how the interests of the West are incongruent with those of Muslims, and this perceived conflict in turn give rises to Muslims' antagonism against the West. Implicatively, Islamic fundamentalism is not directly associated with radicalism, as evidenced in the current research in which it was the most distal predictor of aggressive tendencies. What becomes a red flag in Muslim radicalism is not Islamic fundamentalism per se. Rather, the warning sign originates from Islamic fundamentalists' vulnerability to perceiving conflict between Muslims and the West. This perception of intergroup conflict sets into motion Muslims' aggressive tendencies towards the West by virtue of its role in augmenting the first group's negative stereotypes of the latter group. In sum, explaining the path from Islamic fundamentalism to aggressive tendencies should take into

account multifaceted factors in between. As argued by Moghaddam (2005), the impetus of this complicated route is Islamic fundamentalists' us-versus-them viewpoint. This extreme categorisation makes Muslims vulnerable to see the West as a competitor and, in turn, adopt negative stereotypes about the latter group.

Limitations and Recommendation for Future Research

Negative stereotypes in the current research focused on the ingroup perspectives, denoting the extent to which Muslims believe in their own negative characterisations about the West. However, Kunst, Tajamal, Sam, and Ulleberg (2012) have examined so-called negative meta-stereotypes that refer to the extent to which Muslims believe in Westerners' negative characterisations about Muslims and Islam. They found that the negative meta-stereotypes among Muslims in Norway and Germany were positively associated with the perception that they had experienced religious discrimination, which in turn was negatively associated with this group's public national engagement. This finding suggests how people's beliefs in the perspectives of the outgroup or the ways this particular group evaluate and judge people's own group can also escalate aggressive tendencies. Indeed, previous research reveals that negative meta-stereotypes provoke aggressive tendencies by increasing negative emotions (Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998) and intergroup anxiety (Finchilescu, 2005). Future studies therefore could complement negative stereotypes with negative meta-stereotypes, in order to assess which one of the two best explains Muslims' anger and aggressive tendencies towards the West.

The current research particularly focused on warmth stereotypes. However, the BIAS map specifies that stereotypes can also be related to competence dimension (e.g., capable/incapable, competent/incompetent, intelligent/unintelligent). Assessing competence-related stereotypes is of relevance to the context of the current research. A survey by Pew Research Centre in 2003, for example, showed how Muslims in 39 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa appreciated Western education, science and technology (Pew Research Centre, 2003). These views are indicative of competence stereotypes that Muslims attribute to Westerners. Moreover, future studies could also investigate other emotions besides anger such as contempt. Research by Ufkes et al. (2012) has revealed that anger and contempt were differently predicted by warmth and competence stereotypes, and each of the

emotions differently predicted behavioural tendencies. In particular, they found that warmth stereotypes elicited anger, which in turn triggered active harming (i.e., confronting the stereotyped outgroup), whereas competence stereotypes elicited contempt, which in turn triggered passive harming (i.e., avoiding the stereotyped outgroup). Future studies therefore may profit from assessing warmth and competence stereotypes, as well as anger and contempt. This step is instrumental to get a more comprehensive insight into how Muslims' warmth and competence stereotypes of the West are linked to the first group's feelings of anger and contempt, as well as active harming and passive harming towards the latter group.

Perceived intergroup conflict in the current research was operationalised generically, denoting how much Muslims believe that the relations between their group and Westerners are poor. However, intergroup conflict may actualise in a specific form, in terms of competition over tangible or intangible resources (Esses et al., 1998). Distinction among these various modes of perceived intergroup conflict can be made in future studies. This direction is useful to verify whether Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West is better explained by the perceptions of inharmonious relations between Muslims and Westerners as the focus of the current research, or by the perceptions of competition between the both sides over tangible or intangible resources. Probing this issue may help both scientists and policymakers gain knowledge about what kinds of perceived intergroup conflict that should be tackled, in order to reduce Muslims' negative stereotypes of the West more efficiently and effectively.

Appendices

Appendix A: A Complete List of Items Wording

Islamic Fundamentalism

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1. Allah has given mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.
2. All of the religions including Islam in the world have flaws and wrong teachings (R).
3. Of all the people on this earth, one group has a special relationship with Allah because it believes the most in HIS revealed truths and tries the hardest to follow HIS laws.

4. The long-established traditions in Islam show the best way to honour and serve Allah, and should never be compromised.
5. Islam must admit all its past failings and adapt to modern life if it is to benefit humanity (R).
6. When you get right down to it, there are only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by Allah and the rest, who will not.
7. Islam has different versions of the truth and may be equally right in their own way (R).
8. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against Allah.
9. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in Allah and the right Islam (R).
10. No one religion including Islam is especially close to Allah, nor does Allah favour any particular group of believers (R).
11. Allah will punish most severely those who abandon his true Islam.
12. No single book of religious writings including Qur'an contains all the important truths about life (R).
13. It is silly to think people can be divided into 'the Good' and 'the Evil'. Everyone does some good, and some bad things (R).
14. Allah's true followers must remember that HE requires them to constantly fight Satan and Satan's allies on this earth.
15. Parents should encourage their children to study all religions not just Islam without bias, than make up their own minds about what to believe (R).
16. Islam is a religion on this earth that teaches, without error, Allah's truth.
17. 'Satan' is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is *no such thing* as a diabolical 'Prince of Darkness' who tempts us (R).
18. Whenever science and sacred Qur'an conflict, science must be wrong.
19. There is *no* body of teachings, or set of scriptures, including Qur'an, which is completely without error (R).
20. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, true Islam.

Perceived Intergroup Conflict

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1. I think that Muslims and Westerners easily get to dislike each other.

2. I think the relationship between Islamic worlds and the West is disharmonious.
3. Muslims and Westerners compete with each other.
4. I think there is a conflict between Islamic worlds and the West in the current era.
5. I think the goal attainment of the West damages the goal attainment of Islamic worlds.
6. I think collective interests of the West are in compatible with those of Islamic worlds.

Negative Stereotypes

To what extent do you view the West as having the following traits?

1. Unfriendly.
2. Ill-intentioned.
3. Untrustworthy/insincere.
4. Cold.
5. Ill-natured.

Anger

To what extent do you feel the following emotions towards the past or current Actions by Westerners towards Muslims?

1. Hatred.
2. Angry.
3. Furious.
4. Irritated.

Aggressive Tendencies

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about what Muslims should do as their reactions to their current relations with the West?

1. Muslims should oppose the West.
2. Muslims should confront the West.
3. Muslims should argue with the West.
4. Muslims should find out more about the West (R).

Note. R = Reversed scoring items.

Appendix B: Figures of the Competing Models




Figure B1. The Results of Competing Model 1 by Specifying All Possible Paths Predicting Each Variable

Source: The authors.

Note: $^{***} p < 0.01$; $^{**} p < 0.001$; $^{*} p < 0.05$; ns = not significant.




Figure B2. The Results of Competing Model 2 in Which Anger Precedes Negative Stereotypes in Predicting Aggressive Tendencies

Source: The authors.

Note: * $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.




Figure B3. The Results of Competing Model 3 in Which Perceived Intergroup Conflict Precedes Islamic Fundamentalism.

Source: The authors.

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.




Figure B4. The Results of Alternative Model 4 in Which Anger and Negative Stereotypes Simultaneously Predict Aggressive Tendencies

Source: The authors.

Note: * $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$.




Figure B5. The Results of Alternative Model 5 in Which Islamic Fundamentalism and Anger Were Specified as the Most Proximal Predictors of Aggressive Tendencies

Source: The authors.

Note: $^{***} p < 0.001$; ns = not significant.

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Notes

1. We decided to combine the traits untrustworthiness and insincerity, given within the Indonesian context, the meaning of the two is hard to differentiate.
2. We also assessed right-wing authoritarianism prior to Islamic fundamentalism for exploratory purposes. However, given its low reliability (i.e., $\alpha = 0.49$), the variable was dropped from the analysis.
3. Apart from containing some missing values, the data of the current research did not meet the assumption of multivariate normality, *skewness* = 1.960, $p < 0.001$, *kurtosis* = 26.367, $p < 0.001$.
4. To calculate power, we implemented Monte Carlo simulation analysis using Mplus version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015). Following a recommendation (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015), the data were replicated 10,000 times to run the simulation.

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